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Diversity of reproduction time scale promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s
dilemma games
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We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game where the fitness of the players is
determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the
situation where the selection timescale is slower than the interaction timescale. This is done by
implementing probabilistic reproduction on an individual level. We observe that both too fast and
too slow reproduction rates hamper the emergence of cooperation. In other words, there exists an
intermediate selection timescale that maximizes cooperation. Another factor we find to promote
cooperation is a diversity of reproduction timescales.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many biological, social, and economic systems are built
and sustained by cooperating individuals [1, 2]. The is-
sue of how cooperation emerges and persists among self-
ish individuals is the topic of game theory [3, 4, 5]. The
simplest and most versatile framework for evolutionary
game theory is perhaps the so called symmetric 2 × 2
games [6, 7, 8]. In such games, agents can employ two
behaviors or strategies — cooperative or defective — in
their interaction with others to optimize their fitness.
The goal of this branch of game theory is to establish the
conditions for cooperation (or, equivalently, defection)
to spread. An important 2 × 2 game is the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) that describes the situation when cooper-
ation gives the highest population-level payoff but, in a
short timescale, defection maximizes the expected payoff
of an individual. In well-mixed populations, cooperators
cannot outperform defectors and are doomed to extinc-
tion [5]. There are, however, many arguably realistic
factors that favor cooperation. For example, one such
factor is space — if the players are embedded in space,
allowed only to interact with their neighbors, cooperation
can spread in the population [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. The
microscopic explanation for this phenomenon is that co-
operators can form spatial clusters where the boundaries,
although exploited by defectors, protect the cooperators
within [9, 10, 11]. On complex networks — scale-free
networks in particular — cooperators have a tendency
to occupy high degree nodes, which stabilizes coopera-
tion [12, 13, 14]. For detailed surveys of this field, we
refer to Refs. [15, 16]. From these examples we learn
that the spatial organization, the interaction patterns,
are important elements behind the emergence of cooper-
ation. This raises the question: are there also temporal
patterns promoting cooperation? In a recent work [17],
Chen and Wang investigated the effects of what they call
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“payoff aspiration” (roughly, the lower limit of the payoff
before a player gets impatient changes strategy). They
found that intermediate aspiration levels maximize co-
operation and argue that too high levels cause too fast
strategy changes, while too low levels make the agents
not adaptive enough. These results suggest a more fun-
damental principle — to achieve cooperation, there might
exist an optimal timescale for updating strategies. In the
present paper, we address this hypothesis by studying
evolutionary spatial PD games and by explicitly consid-
ering the time scales of interaction and selection.
One of our basic assumptions is that the selection
timescale is slower than the interaction timescale. This
means that even though each player has a finite lifetime,
it can interact many times before selection occurs. Dur-
ing their lifetimes, agents do not change their strategies
(or phenotype, in a more biological parlance).
How can we connect the payoff of the game to fitness?
The meaning of payoff is more problem-dependent than
fitness — payoff is some result of the interaction that is
correlated with reproduction ability [11, 18] and often
equated, mathematically, with fitness [5, 11, 15]. Some
works using non-standard relationships between payoff
and fitness are Ref. [19] (where a background noise is
added to the payoff to obtain fitness) and Ref. [20] (study-
ing non-linear fitness dependence on payoff). Though
there are many possible ways to characterize the rela-
tionship between payoff and fitness, in our model we as-
sume the two quantities are positively correlated (like in
natural selection), and also including an inheritable fit-
ness component (so called maternal effect [21]), which can
appear due to social, environmental or epigenetic mech-
anisms.
In the rest of the paper, we first introduce our model,
defining the fitness and reproduction time scale. Then
we present our numerical and analytic results in detail
and relate these to other studies.
2II. THE MODEL
A. Payoff and fitness
In the present study we consider evolutionary games
where individuals, located on a two-dimensional square
lattice, play PD games with their closest neighbors. Fol-
lowing common practice [9, 10], we consider pure strate-
gies without self-interaction (where one player also plays
with oneself [9]), and use the following parameterization
of the PD: if two players both cooperate (C) then both
get a “reward” of 1, two defectors (D) both obtain the
“punishment” 0 , a C meeting a D receives “the sucker’s
payoff” 0, while D acquires “the temptation to defect”,
b ∈ [1, 2]. For each site i we define its fitness at genera-
tion t as fi(t) = afi(t− 1) + gi − a gi, where t > 0 is the
generation of i. gi is the instantaneous payoff from the
game and the parameter a ∈ (0, 1), the heritability, sets
the balance between the present and past payoff gains
— the relative importance of a previous generations, or
strength of maternal effects [21] decays with a factor a
per time step.
B. Reproduction
Since our main focus is to evaluate how the diversity
of reproduction timescale affects the evolution of coop-
eration, we discard the normal setup that strategy up-
dating of the players is implemented immediately after a
round of game [15]. Instead, we follow the approach of
Ref. [22], and assume that the timescale of selection is
slower than that of the interaction. In particular, we up-
date the population by using probabilistic dynamics: for
each focal site i, a reproduction event occurs with prob-
ability p, whose magnitude therefore characterizes the
timescale of selection. When p is close to unity, selection
is frequent, while for small values of p the reproduction
event is rare and natural selection is slow. It is easy to see
that the average time of selection on each site is 1/p. By
this simple way, we are also able to introduce diversity
of reproduction timescales.
When strategies are updated, the focal player i and one
randomly selected neighbor, say j, compete for creating
an offspring at i. The focal site will, depending on their
fitnesses, be occupied by either the offspring of i or j. To
be specific, the neighbor j places a new offspring with
the same strategy on the focal site i with a probability
Wj→i =
1
1 + exp [(fi − fj)/κ]
, (1)
where κ measures the probabilistic selection intensity (or
noise, or temperature); otherwise i is replaced with an
offspring of the previous individual at i. A newborn is
assigned the initial fitness fi(0) = 1 (the precise value
of fi(0) does not affect our conclusions). An alternative
interpretation is that the individuals sometimes can start
with new strategies taken from a neighbor with higher
fitness than the individual.
C. Effects of noise
The noise parameter κ is known to have a nontriv-
ial effect on the evolutionary trajectories [23, 24, 25].
More specifically, the highest cooperation levels appear
in moderate amounts of noise. (Here we want to point
out such optimal behavior of noise in promoting coop-
eration is not universal, but dependent on the topology
of the connectivity structure.) Furthermore, in a very
recent paper [26], Szabo´ et al. reported an interesting re-
sult that the Darwinian selection of “temperature” favors
values of κ close to 0.1 which is related to the optimum
providing the highest level of cooperation. In this paper
we will not investigate the effects of κ further, but set κ
to a value, 0.01, that is low enough for the effects of the
game to dominate the effects of noise, and high enough
for selection to occur.
D. Parameter values and simulation technicalities
We investigate our model with Monte Carlo (MC) sim-
ulations. All runs are on a 100× 100 square lattice with
periodic boundary conditions. Initially, either a coopera-
tor or a defector, randomly chosen with equal probability,
occupies each site. During one MC sweep we go through
all players once in a random order. The key observable is
the average fraction Fc of cooperators in the population
in the stationary state, which is measured for the last
10000 sweeps of the total simulation time 6 × 104. The
results presented below are averages over twenty realiza-
tions from independent initial configurations.
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Monomorphic populations
We start by investigating how the heritability a affects
the evolution of cooperation. The simulation results for
Fc as a function of b for three values of a and two values
of p are shown in Fig. 1. In general, we can observe that
with an increasing a, the average fraction of cooperation
grows. For sufficiently large a, the system can even, for
the weakest temptations to defect, reach the absorbing
state of full cooperation. This means that, the ability
of inheritance of fitness from previous generations has a
positive impact on the emergence of cooperation. The
larger a is, the greater is the cooperation level. This re-
sult is somewhat expected since other studies have shown
that the average payoff of C in the equilibrium is greater
than that of D [27].
Even if the a-dependence of Fc is qualitatively ex-
pected, it is rather different for the two p-values of
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Average fraction Fc of cooperation as
a function of b for different values of a. In (a) and (b) the
individuals have reproduction rate p = 0.1 and 0.5, respec-
tively.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Average fraction Fc of cooperators as
a function of b for different values of p. The parameter a is
fixed to 0.9.
Fig. 1(a) and (b). In Fig. 2 we fix a = 0.9 and study how
the average fraction of cooperation evolves as p changes.
For large (p = 0.9) and small (p = 0.05) values Fc is
smaller than for p = 0.1. This result suggests that a
moderate reproduction rate promotes the spread of co-
operation. To make this point clearer, in Fig. 3 we sum-
marize the results of Fc as a function of p for different
values of a. As surmised, the highest cooperation level is
achieved in a region where p is moderate, resembling co-
herence resonance phenomenon — that p alone (without
e.g. any weak periodic force) can promote cooperation, as
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Average fraction of cooperation Fc as
a function of reproduction rate p for b = 1.02. The squares,
circles, and triangles correspond to a = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9,
respectively.
has been found frequently in recent literatures [24, 25].
For example, by introducing additive noise to the pay-
off matrix of the PD game, Perc found that coopera-
tion is maximized at a moderate variance of payoff vari-
ations [24]. Along a different research line, Ren et al.
studied PD game on random regular graphs and found
that there exists an optimal amount of topological ran-
domness, leading to the highest level of cooperation [25].
Going back to our study, note that the optimal value
po, where Fc is maximized, depends on the value a. In-
creasing a will shift po toward smaller values (smaller
reproduction rates). For instance, for a = 0.1 we have
po ≈ 0.41, while for a = 0.9 po is about 0.12. This point
is also reflected by Figs. 1 and 2, where given a = 0.9 the
curves for p = 0.1 take the rightmost position.
The nontrivial behavior of Fc in Figs. 1, 2, and 3 can
be qualitatively understood as follows. As p → 1 —
selection happens frequently; the average fitness of C
should be lower than that of D (due to the frequent
exploitation on C by D), so Fc will decrease. On the
other hand, in case of p → 0 — selection is very slow;
defectors around the boundary have enough time to ob-
tain a fitness high enough to outcompete the cooperators.
This is reminiscent of the observation that the formation
of C-clusters can protect cooperation in the spatial PD,
whereas the clusters of D would deteriorate their own
environment [10, 23, 27]. In the light of this, the maxi-
mal cooperation levels are reached for p-values that are
neither be too large nor too small, so that C has a larger
chance than D to obtain high fitness. In order to investi-
gate this hypothesis further, we will first check what will
happen if the population is well mixed rather than two-
dimensionally extended. Though mean-field treatment
is not appropriate for spatial case, it is a fair first-order
approximation of the well-mixed case.
For simplicity we assume that the average coordination
number (number of interactions per site, per MC sweep)
is z. In the mean-field approximation we can write the
4following equation for the evolution of the average frac- tion of cooperation:
∂Fc
∂t
= (1− Fc)FcWD→C − Fc(1− Fc)WC→D = Fc(1− Fc)
( 1
1 + exp[(fD − fC)/κ]
−
1
1 + exp[(fC − fD)/κ]
)
= −Fc(1 − Fc) tanh
(fD − fC
2κ
)
, (2)
where fC,D denote the average fitness of C and D. The
sign of fD−fC determines whether Fc converges to 1, 0,
or remains unchanged. Since each individual reproduces
with probability p, the average reproduction period is
T = ⌈1/p⌉ where ⌈·⌉ represent the smallest integer larger
than the argument. The average fitness of D at age t
can be written as fD(t) = afD(t − 1) + zbFc. Assume
the age of the individuals are equally distributed in the
region t ∈ [1, T ], using the boundary condition fD(0) =
1, we obtain the average expected fitness of D: fD =∑T−1
i=0 fD(t). After some algebra, we get
fD = p
( T−1∑
i=1
ai + zbFc
T−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
aj
)
, (3a)
fC = p
( T−1∑
i=1
ai + zFc
T−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
aj
)
. (3b)
We can see that for any b > 1, because fD − fC > 0,
Fc will go to zero. The incorporation of spatial ef-
fects or diversity of reproduction times will change this
picture. The permission of only nearest-neighbor in-
teraction, and non-synchronous reproduction, also as-
sures the possibility of fD − fC < 0 at a local spatial
scale. Another factor is that D clusters “defeat them-
selves” [10, 23, 27]. In combination with these obser-
vations, the intrinsic stochasticity of probabilistic repro-
duction gives C a chance to outcompete D for dispersion,
given that p is appropriately selected. As a consequence,
cooperators are favored by diversity of reproduction, and
can even dominate the whole population provided that b
is sufficiently small.
B. Polymorphic populations
In reality there is a spread in reproduction times. We
proceed to investigate the effects of diversity on our PD
model. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to a bimodal
distribution of p-values: we assign p = 0.1 to a fraction
v of the players and p = 0.9 to the rest.
In Fig. 4 we show the dependence of Fc on b for a = 0.9
and different values of v. We find that for appropriate
mixing of the two types of individuals, for instance v =
0.5 and 0.7, the final cooperative level is further enhanced
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FIG. 4: Average fraction of cooperation Fc as a function of b
for different systems where fraction v of population has repro-
duction rate 0.1, and the others have p = 0.9. The parameter
a is set to 0.9.
as compared to a monomorphic population (v = 0 or 1).
To investigate this further, in Fig. 5 we graph Fc(b) for
three systems: one with a polymorphic population where
half of the population has p = 0.1 the other has p =
0.9, another with a monomorphic population of the same
average reproduction rate p = 0.5 as the polymorphic
population, and a third monomorphic population with
the same average life time as the polymorphic population
(giving p = 0.18). In this comparison, the polymorphic
population has a higher cooperation level than both the
monomorphic reference populations.
From Fig. 4, we also note that an intermediate mixing
of reproduction rate of the population benefits the main-
tenance of cooperation. This finding is corroborated by
Fig. 6 where Fc(v) is displayed for various b-values. For
small b, Fc can reach unity even for moderate values of
v. With an increasing temptation to defect, the region of
v with non-zero cooperation vanishes. Despite this, the
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Average fraction Fc of cooperators as
a function of b for three special cases where all players have
a reproduction rate p = 0.5 (squares), p = 0.18 (circles), and
50% individuals with p = 0.1 and the remaining with p = 0.9
(triangles). Note that the population with half p = 0.1 and
half p = 0.9 have the same average reproduction rate as the
population with p = 0.5, and the same average life span as
the population with p = 0.18.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Average fraction of cooperators as a
function of the balance between reproduction rates v for dif-
ferent values of b. v = 0 or 1 represent monomorphic popu-
lations; diversity (measured in standard deviation) is largest
for v = 1/2. a is set to parameter 0.9.
peak of Fc is located at intermediate p-values.
The enhancement of cooperation at intermediate lev-
els of mixing of two types of individuals can be explained
in the same vein as Ref. [28], where Szolnoki and Szabo´
studied evolutionary PD game with a fraction v of play-
ers having higher influence to spread their strategies than
the others. They found that highest level of cooperation
is attained when v is around 0.5. Their interpretation
was that the less influential individuals act as follow-
ers [28] which stabilizes cooperation. In our case, by
analogy, we can assume individuals with high reproduc-
tion (large p) act as followers [28], since, on average, they
always get lower fitness than those with slow reproduc-
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FIG. 7: (Color online) The cumulative distribution of the
fitness of agents with different p-values in a mix of half p = 0.1,
half p = 0.9. (a) shows the fitness for agents with p = 0.1,
(b) shows curves for agents with p = 0.9. Solid and dashed
lines are for C, D, respectively. Other parameters: a = 0.9,
b = 1.1. Under such parameterization, the final fraction of C
with p = 0.1, and p = 0.9, is about 0.38(2), and 0.33(2); the
corresponding D with p = 0.1, and p = 0.9, is about 0.12(2),
and 0.17(2), respectively.
tion rate. This point can be verified by the data presented
in Fig. 7, where the cumulative distribution of the fitness
of the population is shown. In this sense, even though the
microscopic mechanisms are different, both our present
model and that of Ref. [28] can be regarded as belong-
ing to a generalized class that adjusts the temporal or-
ganization of the individuals in a way that maximizes
cooperation.
To further investigate how the difference of reproduc-
tion rate affects the evolution of cooperation; we mea-
sure the v-dependence of extinction threshold of bD and
bC — the values of b that demarcate the region of coex-
isting cooperators and defectors. The simulation results
are shown in Fig. 8. Between the upper and lower critical
points C and D can coexist. Above (below) this region
only defectors (cooperators) remain alive in the final sta-
tionary states. Note that, for the sake of comparison, we
extend the b-values to the region smaller than 1 where
the game is a Stag-Hunt game rather than a PD [15].
From this figure, we observe that for intermediate v both
bD and bC attain their maximum values, though not at
the same v.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) The extinction thresholds bC , bD of
cooperators and defectors, respectively, as a function of v.
The parameter a = 0.9. Note that the range of b extends to
values lower than 1, where the game is not a proper prisoner’s
dilemma.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
To summarize, in the present work we have proposed
and analyzed an evolutionary, spatial prisoner’s dilemma
game including a partial inheritance of fitness, a prob-
abilistic reproduction, and a diversity of reproduction
rates. The combination of these factors gives rise to
rich dynamic behavior of the system. In particular, the
stronger the ability of inheritance of fitness is, the more
cooperation is there. The reproduction rate has a non-
trivial effect on the evolution of cooperation. When the
parameter a (characterizing the strength of inheritance
of fitness) is fixed, the highest cooperation level is re-
alized for moderate reproduction rates. Both too slow
and too fast reproduction rates can harm cooperation.
Moreover, we find that the presence of diversity of re-
production rate can enhance cooperation. The behavior
of promoting cooperation is found to resemble coherence
resonance. These findings suggest that the heterogeneity
of individual traits might benefit cooperation in PD situ-
ation, giving another clue to the emergence of population
in social and biological systems of selfish individuals.
In a recent work, Qin et al. [29] explored the effects
of infinite memory in a spatial PD game (allowing self-
interaction). They found that with a moderate mem-
ory effect, the extinction threshold bD reaches a maximal
value, but observed no such behavior for bC . Their mem-
ory mechanism is similar to the maternal-effect fitness
inheritance in our model. In another related work [22],
Roca et al. considered independent interaction and se-
lection timescales in evolutionary games. The authors
studied all 12 nonequivalent symmetric 2× 2 games, and
found that, depending on the type of the game, rapid se-
lection may lead to changes of the asymptotic equilibria
and changes in the basins of attraction [22]. Ref. [22]
differs from ours in the approach to strategy updates —
they model updates as a Moran process, whereas we use
a stochastic migration rule; and in the interaction con-
figuration they, in contrast to us, consider a non-spatial
(or well-mixed) population.
One future problem is how cooperators vanish as the
temptation to defect increases. For evolutionary PD with
stochastic imitation rules Szabo´ and To˝ke [10] found a
phase transition of the directed percolation universality
class [10]. We expect a similar transition can occur in
our model in the case of large value of p. However, this
point needs to be confirmed in further studies. Moreover,
how the p-value maximizing Fc depends on the param-
eter a is not addressed in the present work. The work
in [12] suggests that large degree nodes are important
for promoting cooperation. In a recent paper [30], mid-
dle degree nodes, on the other hand, are found to be
crucial for stabilizing cooperation. Along these lines, we
expect that the integration of inhomogeneous interaction
pattern and reproductive diversity to our present model
would be interesting.
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